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1 Introduction 
1.1 Topic 
At present, there exists a somewhat tense relationship between the enforcement of 
international criminal law and the Westphalian-based system of relationships between 
sovereign states.1 This study examines the tension between the sovereignty and universality 
in international criminal law. This is done through examining the principle of 
complementarity, and particularly its relationship to prosecution based on universal 
jurisdiction. The principle of complementarity is one of the underlying admissibility 
principles for the International Criminal Court (Hereinafter: “The Court”), established by 
the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.2 This principle is expressed in 
the Preamble, Article 1 and Article 17.   
1.1.1 Historical background 
The enforcement of international criminal law can be divided into two categories, 
prosecution in other states based on universal jurisdiction, and prosecution through 
international criminal courts and tribunals. Both categories share a similar feature; they 
allow for an alternative judiciary when the primary prosecutor for some reason fails to 
enforce international criminal law. 
 
The principle of universal jurisdiction provides the State with legitimate jurisdiction over a 
criminal act without requiring a territorial or national connection to the criminal act.3 
Universal jurisdiction is a relatively modern legal principle. Prior to World War II, criminal 
                                                
1 Broomhall (2003) p. 2. 
2 UN General Assembly. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 17 July 
1998. A/CONF. 183/9. 
3 Colangelo (2006) p. 150-151. 
 2 
prosecution was an exclusive national matter, closely connected to the State and based on 
its territorial jurisdiction.4 However, its historical lines and its origins as a philosophical 
principle can be drawn back to the works of 17th century philosopher Hugo Grotius, and to 
the 19th century efforts to combat piracy in the high seas.5  
 
In the 1949 Geneva Convention6 the principle of universal jurisdiction was laid down for 
the grave breaches of enumerated war crimes.7 One early modern example of prosecution 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction can be found in the Eichmann case in Israel in 1961.8 
The next turning point for universal jurisdiction came in 1998, with the Pinochet9 hearings 
in the United Kingdom and the adoption of the Rome Statute. This brought a revived focus 
on prosecuting international crimes. 
 
International criminal law as a legal subject has evolved through the establishment of 
international institutions for prosecuting international crimes. Historical lines can be traced 
back to the prosecution of war crimes in the second half of the 19th century, starting with 
the Lieber Code issued in 1863 by President Lincoln, which attempted to codify the law of 
warfare.10 The modern development of international criminal law can roughly be divided 
into three periods. The first substantial development came in 1945, with the London 
                                                
4 Cassese (2008) p. 27. 
5 Philippe (2006) p. 378. 
6 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 
1949. 75 UNTS 287. 
7 Cassese (2008) p. 31. 
8 Arendt (1963)  
9 House of Lords (United Kingdom). R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, 
Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte. 3 WLR 1,456 (H.L. 1998). 
10 Cassese (2008) p. 28. 
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Agreement and the creation of the criminal tribunals in Nürnberg and Tokyo.11 The 
tribunals were established to individually prosecute criminal activity by leaders of the Axis 
powers during World War II. The London Agreement set forth both a list of crimes subject 
to the tribunal, and general principles recognised as general and fundamental to 
international criminal law, such as the principle of legality and the presumption of 
innocence.12 An additional development in this first period was the adoption of the 1948 
Genocide Convention13, which defined the substantive rules for genocide as a crime. 
 
The second period came in the early 1990s, with the establishment of the ad hoc criminal 
tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda14 and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.15 These two distinct tribunals were given a shared 
Appellate Chamber and Prosecutor, to provide uniformity in the enforcement of 
international judicial jurisdiction. These tribunals were also given primacy over the 
national courts in cases of conflict with concurrent jurisdiction. In the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the on-going conflict in Bosnia made the national courts unlikely to conduct 
fair trials across ethnicities.16 In Rwanda, the depletion of the national legal system during 
and after the 1994 Rwandan Genocide left only 244 judges and a judicial system that 
comprised of only 1.800 people, preventing it from rendering justice.17   
 
The third period of the development of international criminal law started with the adoption 
of the Rome Statute in 1998 and its entry into force in 2002. On March 14, 2012 the first 
                                                
11 Ibid. p. 15. 
12 Ibid p. 15-20. 
13 United Nations. Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. 9 December 
1948. A/RES/260. 
14 UN Security Council Resolution 808. 22 February 1993. S/RES/808 (1993). 
15 UN Security Council Resolution 955. 8 November 1994. S/RES/955 (1994). 
16 Cassese (2008) p. 338.  
17 Sarkin (2001) p. 156. 
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conviction by the ICC marked “a milestone in the evolution of international criminal law”, 
as expressed by Ben Ferencz of the Nürnberg tribunal.18  
 
Contrary to the primary jurisdiction of the ICTR and ICTY, admissibility to the ICC is built 
on a principle of complementarity.19 This means that the prosecution by the ICC is 
subsidiary to national prosecution in cases where a national court is willing and able to 
prosecute. This ensures an effective prosecution, and establishes primary responsibility for 
enforcing international criminal law at the national level, as the ICC will never have 
institutional capacity to investigate and prosecute the massive amount of potential cases. At 
the same time, the principle ensures that the most serious of international crimes will not go 
unpunished. 
1.1.2 Research question 
The exercise of universal jurisdiction can potentially conflict with states’ sovereignty. The 
ICC, on the other hand, are complementary to national jurisdiction. One could therefore 
validly argue that the ICC should be the appropriate forum for prosecuting international 
crimes. This thesis studies the relationship between the ICC and universal jurisdiction. The 
research question is more specifically; what relevance can the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction have over the principle of complementarity?  
 
The research question is relevant because of the potential conflict between the principles of 
universalism in prosecuting international crimes and the sovereignty of independent states, 
which must take into account different considerations. On one hand, some crimes are so 
harmful to the international community that they cannot go unpunished. On the other hand, 
the sovereign right for states not to have internal affairs interfered with is one of the core 
principles in international law. In this thesis I argue that universal jurisdiction can be an 
                                                
18 Ferencz (2012) 
19 As expressed in para 10 in the Preamble and Art. 1 of the Rome Statutes. 
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relevant factor in international criminal law besides the ICC, as it partly supports and 
complements the enforcement of the conventional and customary framework.20  
 
Universal jurisdiction is a concept, while the ICC is an institution. The conceptual 
difference in prosecution based on the two respective regimes will therefore be a central 
part of this study. This study does not aim to conclude whether or not universal jurisdiction 
should be applied after the adoption of the Rome Statute, but rather examines the relevant 
differences in the two systems, and examines problematic issues and possibilities for the 
two regimes to co-exist and potentially act as catalysts.  
 
The respective legal and theoretical foundations of universal jurisdiction and the principle 
of complementarity will be analysed in order to present issues of conflict in their context. 
The research question will be discussed by highlighting some procedural and subject-
matter issues regarding the principle of complementarity, and by focusing on the role of the 
ICC as an incentive for national proceedings. Finally, issues where the exercising of 
universal jurisdiction can be relevant to complement the ICC regime will be analysed.  
1.2 Method, structure and applicable law 
1.2.1 Definitions 
By using the term “international criminal law”, I am referring to a core of agreed treaty-
based, and to some extent customary-based, norms that establish individual criminal 
responsibility for certain international crimes (see infra section 1.2.2).21  
 
An “international crime” is a crime that can be prosecuted by any country.22 A more 
specific definition was given by the subsequent Nürnberg trials in List and others, in which 
an international crime was defined as an act universally recognized as criminal, which is a 
                                                
20 Hall (2010) p. 201.   
21 Broomhall (2003) pp. 9-24.  
22 Philippe (2006) p. 377. 
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grave matter of international concern that for some valid reason cannot be left within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the State.23 In modern international criminal law, an international 
crime also entails personal criminal liability for violations of international customary rules 
and treaty provisions.24 A Head of State, foreign minister or diplomat enjoys immunity ex 
officio from personal criminal liability and personal immunity as long as he is serving.25   
 
“Sovereignty” is one of the core principles in international law. It is expressed in the UN 
Charter Art. 2 (1) as a founding principle for the UN and Art. 2 (7) as a principle 
prohibiting intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of states. Sovereignty is for the 
purpose of this study understood as a “legal status within but not above public international 
law”.26 It is a principle that can be balanced by other principles, such as universality. One 
important aspect of sovereignty for a State is control over its internal affairs, although 
subject to limitations imposed by international law.27    
 
Somewhat contrary to the principle of sovereignty is the principle of universalism. In here 
is embedded an idea that some norms are erga omnes, owed towards all. “Universal 
jurisdiction” can be defined as a principle, which allows for (permissive), or demands 
(mandatory), the prosecution for certain crimes, regardless of where the crime was 
committed or the nationality of the suspect or the victim, or where the suspect is held in 
                                                
23 Stigen (2005) p. 1 at note 4. 
24 Cassese (2008) p. 11.  
25 ICJ Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Rwanda). 
Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application. Judgmend. 3 February 2006. 
ICJ Reports 2006 37, p. 3. 
26 Kleffner (2008) p. 314 at note 16. 
27 Oxford Dictionary of Law. Sovereignty, p. 519.  
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custody.28 For a State to exercise universal jurisdiction, the crime does not have to have any 
discernible impact on the territory or security of the concerned State.29  
 
I will use the term “situation” for preliminary examinations and investigations, and “case” 
for pre-trial or trial proceedings.30 A referral by a State Party or the UN Security Council is 
therefore to be considered a “situation”.31 The differentiation of situations and cases 
reduces the possibility of states using complaints against specific persons for political gain 
when referring to the ICC, leaving the selection of cases to the Prosecutor’s discretion.32 
1.2.2 Scope and limits of the thesis 
Regarding jurisdiction, this study is limited to criminal responsibility for international 
crimes, leaving out the possibility of claims based on universal civil jurisdiction.33 
 
The scope of “international crimes” in this thesis will apply only to the core crimes under 
the ICC, including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.34 Typical 
international crimes that, at the present, fall outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the ICC 
are acts of terrorism and drug trafficking.35 State accountability for international crimes 
                                                
28 Philippe (2006) s. 377. 
29 Broomhall (2003) p. 106.  
30 This is in accordance with the distinction in Art. 13 litra (a) and (b), 14 (1) and 19 (3) of 
the Rome Statute.  
31 Olasolo (2011) p. 394.  
32 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I. Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Ntaganda. Annex II. Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of arrest, Article 58. 10 February 2006. ICC-
01/04-01/07, para 21 og 31.  
33 Donovan (2006) p. 142. 
34 ICC Art. 5 (1). The crime of aggression is at present considered a core international 
crime, but as it has not yet been ratified as an amendment to the Rome Statute, the ICC 
have presently no jurisdiction over it.  
35 Cryer (2007) p. 2.  
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will fall outside of the scope of this study. 
 
Regarding complementarity, this study will not aim to present the whole picture regarding 
the admissibility to the Court through the procedural phases of complementarity, but rather 
extract some examples where they can shed light on the main research question of the 
study. Likewise, this study will not be able to encompass a comparative study of every state 
that have exercised universal jurisdiction, focusing instead on key states and key cases. 
1.2.3 Legal sources 
As international criminal law is a subset of international law, the same legal sources for 
international law also apply for international criminal law. One traditional listing of these 
sources can be found in the ICJ Statute Art. 38 (1), and includes treaties, customary 
international law and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.36 As a 
subsidiary means for determining the law, Art. 38 (1) litra (d) permits judicial decisions 
and legal writings of highly qualified scholars to be used. A similar listing of these sources 
of applicable law can be found in Art. 21 of the Rome Statute, which list the internal and 
external sources of applicable law for the Court. This thesis will use the Rome Statute as a 
primary source, with a main focus on Art. 17-20 on admissibility. Additionally, the Court’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence will also aid to form a supplemental basis for analysis.37  
 
As there have been only a few cases before the ICC to date, ICC case law remains a 
quantitatively limited source. Jurisprudence from the ad-hoc tribunals for Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia will therefore be used where applicable for general interpretation. Although the 
rulings and decisions of the ad-hoc tribunals are not of precedential character for the ICC, 
                                                
36 United Nations. Statute of the International Court of Justice. 26 June 1945. 33 UNTS 
993. 
37 ICC-ASP Rules of Procedure (2002). According to Art. 51 (5) of the Rome Statute, the 
Statute is primary to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, should different interpretations 
of a rule need to be harmonized. 
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they hold persuasive authority and can therefore shed light on issues of interpretation.38 
Rulings by the International Court of Justice and its predecessor the Permanent Court of 
International Justice will also be used for the interpretation of general rules of international 
law.39 
 
As only one rule of interpreting the applicable law can be found in Art. 21 of the Rome 
Statute,40 the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art. 31-33 will be used to 
generally interpret the Rome Statute.41  
 
Secondary sources, such as legal literature by scholars and commentaries to the Statute, 
will also be used to answer the research question.   
1.2.4 Structure 
This study is structured so that Chapter 2 examines the conceptual differences between the 
jurisdiction of the ICC and the universal jurisdiction. As the Rome Statute differentiates 
between jurisdiction and admissibility, Chapter 3 will present the subject matter of the 
principle of complementarity. Chapter 4 will examine issues regarding that indicates a 
tension between the principles of complementarity and sovereignty. Chapter 5 will examine 
the advantages and shortcomings of the principle of complementarity to incite national 
proceedings and universal jurisdiction to act as complement to the ICC. In Chapter 6, some 
concluding remarks will be given. 
 
 
 
                                                
38 Sedman (2010) p. 262 at note 13.  
39 The ICJ has yet to elaborate on the provisions of universal jurisdiction.  
40 Art. 21 (3) states that the interpretation of the Statute must be “consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights”.  
41 United Nations. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 23 May 1969. 1155 UNTS 
331. 
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2 Jurisdiction 
2.1 Conceptual differences regarding jurisdiction 
One aspect of this study is the concurrent jurisdiction of states prosecuting based on 
universal jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the ICC. First and foremost, universal 
jurisdiction for international crimes (as defined in section 1.2.1) is primarily based in 
customary international law42, whereas the jurisdiction of the ICC is based on treaty law, 
the Rome Statute. It can therefore be argued that the rules regulating the jurisdiction of the 
ICC are positively regulated in more detail than universal jurisdiction. 
 
There are five traditional bases of jurisdiction in international law:  
1. Territorial jurisdiction, when the crime was committed in the State’s territory.  
2. Active personality, the nationality of the offender.   
3. Passive personality, the nationality of the victim.  
4. Protection of vital state interests.  
5. Universal jurisdiction, some international crimes are believed to be of such 
importance, that jurisdiction can be exercised universally.43  
Nr. 2-5 can be exercised extraterritorial, meaning that a State can have a legitimate claim of 
jurisdiction outside of its normal territory. 
 
There is a lack of hierarchy between concurrent jurisdictional claims for adjudication of 
international crimes between sovereign entities.44 I will come back to this in section 4.4 
                                                
42 Customary international law refers to a general and consistent State practice followed by 
opinio juris, a sense of legal obligation. See Scharf (2001) p. 373 and Stigen (2009) p. 12.   
43 Schabas (2007) p. 58.  
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regarding horizontal complementarity. In the ICC regime, there exists such a principle of 
hierarchy between concurrent jurisdictional claims, which is the principle of 
complementarity. I will examine this further in section 3.1.  
 
Jurisdiction can be separated into three different categories: legislative, judicial and 
enforcement jurisdiction.45 The ICC is a treaty-based international court and therefore 
enjoys no legislative jurisdiction in itself. When states prosecute based on universal 
jurisdiction, they exercise judicial or enforcement jurisdiction. The term “jurisdiction” for 
the matter of this study will therefore exclude legislative jurisdiction.  
 
A related principal difference between the jurisdiction of the ICC and universal jurisdiction 
is that the Rome Statute distinguishes between jurisdiction and admissibility. If the ICC has 
jurisdiction over a case, the case must still be admissible in order for the case to be 
adjudicated. One part of the admissibility test is the complementarity principle. On the 
other hand, a State which have jurisdiction is in principle allowed to exercise that 
jurisdiction based on its sovereignty.46 I will therefore examine the principle of 
complementarity by itself in Chapter 3.    
2.1.1 Jurisdiction of the ICC 
Contrary to universal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the ICC is based on the territoriality 
and the nationality principle, founded in a treaty-based delegation of jurisdiction from its 
State Parties. This is a core difference in the two regimes. Jurisdiction over international 
crimes exercised by the ICC is therefore international jurisdiction, and not universal 
jurisdiction.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
44 Cryer (2007) p. 37.  
45 Cryer (2010) p. 43.  
46 Ryngaert (2011) p. 858. 
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A non-State Party can also give the Court jurisdiction over a specific situation by giving an 
ad-hoc declaration of jurisdiction.47 The lower threshold of what constitutes a “non-State 
Party” is presently not defined. In the case of the ad-hoc declaration of jurisdiction from 
Palestine, the Prosecutor decided that he was unable to interpret whether Palestine qualified 
as a state.48 For this study, a “non-State Party” will mean a declared and recognized 
sovereign state that is not State Party to the Rome Statute.  
 
The UN Security Council can act under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
and refer a situation in any state, including non-State Parties if the State is a member of the 
UN, for investigation by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor.49 This can be seen as a derived 
form of universal jurisdiction, if the crime is committed in a non-State Party’s territory, and 
the perpetrator is a national of a non-State Party. 
 
The jurisdiction of the ICC can be divided in four categories, temporal, territorial, personal 
and subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
The temporal jurisdiction prohibits the Court from exercising jurisdiction over crimes 
committed before the Statute entered into force 1 July 2002.50 This is closely linked to the 
principle of non-retroactivity ratione personae in Art. 24.51 Non-retroactivity of treaty 
provisions is also considered customary treaty law, codified in VCLT Art. 28. Crimes 
already committed or on-going at the time the treaty came into force are therefore not 
punishable. This narrow interpretation has been chosen even if the crimes committed were 
                                                
47 Rome Statute Art. 12 (3). 
48 ICC-OTP (2012) p. 1-2. 
49 Rome Statute Art. 13 litra (b). 
50 Rome Statute Art. 11 (1).  
51 Art. 24 (1) precludes criminal responsibility for conduct prior to the entry into force of 
the Statute.  
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criminally liable under treaty based or customary international law prior to the Rome 
Statute’s entry into force.52  
 
Rome Statute Art. 12 (2) litra a addresses territorial jurisdiction and gives the Court 
jurisdiction over crimes regardless of the nationality of the suspect as long as the crime was 
committed on the territory of any State Party.53 Territorial jurisdiction therefore does not 
apply to non-State Parties.54 However, an ad-hoc declaration given by a non-State Party or 
a Security Council referral can give the Court jurisdiction over non-State Parties.55 This 
was the situation when Security Council Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Sudan to 
the ICC for prosecuting international crimes committed in Darfur.56  
 
The active personality jurisdiction of the Court, as expressed in Art. 12 (2) litra b, gives the 
Court jurisdiction over any national of a State Party. According to customary international 
law, this applies to those who do not benefit from immunity.57 But according to Art. 27, the 
Court is not barred from exercising its jurisdiction on grounds of immunity. The Court can 
exercise jurisdiction based on active personality regardless of where the crime was 
committed, which also includes non-State Parties.58 Personal jurisdiction can also be given 
to the Court on an ad hoc basis by declaration by a non-member state, or by an UN 
                                                
52 It could be argued that a strictly procedural assumption of jurisdiction would in itself not 
come into conflict with the principle of substantive ex post facto criminalisation. See 
Triffterer (ed.) (2008) p. 539-545.  
53 Rome Statute Art. 12 (2) litra a.  
54 This would be in violation of VCLT Art. 34 regarding non-consentual treaty obligations. 
See Triffterer (ed.) (2008) p. 557. 
55 Rome Statute Art. 12 (3). See also Schabas (2007) p. 75.  
56 Triffterer (ed.) (2008) p. 557.  
57 Ibid. p. 558. See also ICJ DRC v. Belgium supra note 25. 
58 Rome Statute Art. 12 (2) litra b.  
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Security Council decision.59 So far none of the cases the Court has opened have been based 
on active personality, although the Prosecutor has made inquiries regarding acts made by 
nationals of the United Kingdom, a non-State Party, during the invasion in Iraq.60  
 
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the core international crimes listed 
in the Rome Statute Art. 5(1). Presently, these include genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The crime of aggression is also within the Court’s jurisdiction, but is 
pending ratification of the amendment of the Rome Statute.61 
2.1.2 Universal jurisdiction 
In classic international law, sovereignty prohibits State A to assert criminal jurisdiction 
over offences in State B by nationals of any other state than State A. However, some 
international crimes are omitted from this prohibition, on the basis of universal jurisdiction. 
Although there is no direct causal relationship, universal jurisdiction is founded on the 
premise that some norms are so universally endorsed, and the violations of those norms are 
so abhorrent, that they constitute an attack on the international community as a whole. 
They are therefore erga omnes, or owed toward all. Some norms might also be considered 
jus cogens, meaning that they are non-derogable and binding on all states. Genocide is an 
example of an erga omnes norm, as confirmed by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case.62 
The prohibition of the crime of genocide is also a jus cogens norm, meaning that it is non-
derogable, and that every State is obligated to prevent the crime of genocide.63  
 
                                                
59 Rome Statute Art. 12 (3). Schabas (2007) p. 71.  
60 Triffterer (ed.) (2008) p. 558.  
61 ICC Assembly of State Parties. The crime of aggression. RC/Res. 6. 11 June 2010. 
62 ICJ Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain). Second 
Phase. ICJ Reports 1970 3., para 33. 
63 ICJ Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Rwanda). 
Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application. Judgmend. 3 February 2006. 
ICJ Reports 2006 37, para 64.  
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The classic view on jurisdiction in international law was formulated in the 1927 SS Lotus 
case. The question here was whether Turkey could prosecute a French sailor for 
negligence. The PCIJ found that any State might exercise universal jurisdiction, unless 
there is a specific rule preventing the State from doing so.64 This applies to judicial (and, 
for other purposes not discussed here, legislative) jurisdiction. For enforcement 
jurisdiction, the rule has been believed to be opposite.65 But state practice indicates that 
rather than relying on absence of prohibition, states have traditionally sought to ground the 
use of universal jurisdiction through positive law.66 In the ICJ Arrest Warrant case, two 
separate opinions in the Judgment also supported this view.67 
 
Universal jurisdiction can be permissive or mandatory, leaving the State either permitted or 
obligated to exercise jurisdiction.68 Examples of mandatory universal jurisdiction can be 
found in Art. 146 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 85 (1) of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I, and Art. 5 and 7 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture. The 
obligation here is “aut dedere aut judicare,” meaning to either extradite or prosecute. 
Related to this obligation is the possible principle for subsidiarity in exercising universal 
jurisdiction. This is discussed further in Section 4.4.  
 
One of the turning points in the evolution of universal jurisdiction was the Pinochet 
Judgment of the UK Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in November 1998, ruling 
that the former Chilean Head of State was not entitled to claim immunity from the 
jurisdiction of an English lower court. The English court was found to have jurisdiction 
                                                
64 PCIJ Case Concerning S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 7 September  
1927 P.C.I.J. Series A No. 10. See also Cryer (2010) p. 45.     
65 Ibid.  
66 Stigen (2009) p. 6. 
67 ICJ DRC v. Belgium supra note 25. Separate opinion of President Guillaume, paras 13-
14 and Separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Koojimans and Buergenthal, paras 49-51. 
68 Broomhall (2003) p. 105.  
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over an extradition request from Spain, facing charges for crimes against humanity and 
torture committed while he was still Head of State.69 The decision on the lack of immunity 
on the basis of customary international law was later overturned. However, a third ruling 
based the extradition on the 1984 Convention Against Torture, instead of customary 
international law.70 The Pinochet Judgment is relevant to the application of universal 
jurisdiction because it emphasised the primacy of national courts for prosecuting the most 
serious international crimes. It also reaffirmed the principle that some crimes are so serious 
that any state may claim jurisdiction and that national courts in regards to these 
international crimes can therefore exercise judicial jurisdiction without any territorial 
connection to the crime.71 
 
The subject matter of universal jurisdiction is provided both in customary international law 
and international treaties. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the crimes in their 
fullest detail; however, a representation of the crimes is supplied to provide some legal 
context. This study, which is limited to the international crimes as listed in the Rome 
Statute Art. 5 (1) except aggression, will therefore not examine crimes that are subject to 
universal jurisdiction but fall out of the Rome Statute, for example piracy and terrorism. 
These are only referred to when they shed light on a specific question.  
 
Crimes that can be tried on the basis of universal jurisdiction, as provided by treaty law, 
include war crimes. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 established that persons alleged to 
have committed or ordered grave breaches in international armed conflicts are subject to 
“the jurisdiction of all State Parties”. The text of the treaty is limited to State Parties; 
however, the Geneva Conventions are believed to have reached a status of customary law, 
leaving war crimes applicable to voluntary universal jurisdiction. Art. 7 provide that the 
State must extradite or “submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
                                                
69 Sands (2003) p. 68. 
70 Ibid. p. 93.  
71 Ibid. pp. 69-70. 
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prosecution”. This indicates a somewhat weaker obligation to prosecute than the mandatory 
prosecution provided in the Genocide Convention Art. VI.  
 
The Genocide Convention provides an obligation to “punish” those responsible for 
genocide, not just to investigate or prosecute. However, similar to the wording in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, Genocide Convention Art. VI does not establish a principle of 
universal jurisdiction but limits prosecution to State Parties and international criminal 
tribunals only; in other words, based on a territoriality principle. In the Eichmann trial, the 
defendant claimed that universal jurisdiction over genocidal crimes was inconsistent with 
Art. VI.72 This was dismissed by the Israeli court on the basis that universal jurisdiction 
over crimes of genocide had become customary international law in that the crime was of 
such a grave offence it had to be considered delicta juris gentium, a crime against the law 
of nations itself.73 This was also a necessary basis for the Israeli court to have temporal 
jurisdiction to adjudicate in a case where the crime happened before Israel existed. 
 
The term “crimes against humanity” lacks a uniform definition, and there exists no specific 
treaty for prosecuting based on universal jurisdiction. It is, however, considered to be 
customary international law.74 Some crimes that generally fall in under crimes against 
humanity also have a basis in treaty law. An example of this is the Torture Convention. In 
Art. 7 (1) it is provided an obligation for State Parties to prosecute or extradite alleged 
perpetrators of the crime of torture. This is also considered customary international law by 
the ICTY.75 
 
                                                
72 Oliver (1962) p. 805.  
73 Oliver (1962) p. 808, para 12.  
74 ICTY Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction. 2 October 1995, para 58.  
75 ICTY Prosecutor v. Furundzija. Judgmend. 10 December 1998. IT-95-17/1-T, para 156. 
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Regarding universal jurisdiction based on customary law, Stigen argues for a more 
conservative approach, finding grave breaches (i.e. war crimes) to be the only ICC crime 
that may be subject to universal jurisdiction based on customary law.76 However, the ICTR 
and the ICTY have both argued that the crimes within their subject matter jurisdiction, 
which also falls under ICC jurisdiction, are subject to universal jurisdiction.77 Stigen holds 
that these opinions are outside of the tribunal’s mandates. But on the other hand, the 
jurisprudence of the ad-hoc tribunals holds considerable respect in the ICC reasoning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
76 Stigen (2008) p. 192.  
77 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para. 156; Prosecutor v. Tadic, para. 62; and Prosecutor v. 
Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber, para. 13 (upheld by the Appeals Chamber). Cited in Stigen 
(2008) p. 192 (note 634). See also Sedman (2010) p. 262 at note 13. 
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3 Complementarity 
3.1 The principle of complementarity 
Admissibility to the ICC is based on a principle of complementarity. An alternative to this 
would be to base the jurisdiction of the ICC on universal jurisdiction, where a case would 
be admissible regardless of national proceedings. While the Rome Statute does not give a 
definition of the principle of complementarity, in general, complementarity is a state of 
being complementary, or serving to complete something else. A contextual interpretation of 
complementarity inferred from the other provisions of the Rome Statute suggests that the 
ICC can assume jurisdiction over certain crimes only when the Court is satisfied that 
domestic authorities are “unable” or “unwilling” to exercise jurisdiction through 
investigations or prosecution. This is one of the cornerstones of the ICC, manifested in the 
Preamble and Art. 1 of the Rome Statute.78 An ordinary meaning79 of the term 
“complementarity” can be interpreted as a condition where different parts relate to one 
another, and thereby supplies each other’s deficiencies, forming a unit.80 When applied to 
international law, complementarity can therefore be seen as a bridge between national and 
international jurisdiction.81 
 
                                                
78 Interpreting the Rome Statute in light of VCLT Art. 31 (2) suggests that the Preamble is 
an integral part of the treaty, and that the legal obligations manifested in the Preamble 
should be equal to the legal obligations in the main body of the treaty.  
79 VCLT Art. 31 (1). 
80 Kleffner (2008) p. 100. 
81 Stahn (2009) p. xvii.  
 22 
The State Parties have the primary responsibility for prosecution of international crimes.  
Only subsequently are they admissible to the ICC, given that they fall in under the 
jurisdiction of the Court. This principle is expressed in the Rome Statutes Preamble and 
Art. 1. The legal rule is further elaborated as an admissibility criterion in Art. 17 and 20, 
establishing the substantive criteria and material elements of the principle. Art. 18 and 19 
contain rules regarding procedure (preliminary rulings on admissibility and procedure) 
when the jurisdiction of or admissibility to the ICC is challenged. The Prosecutor is to 
consider the admissibility of an investigation before he initiates an investigation.82 He must 
also consider the national judicial proceedings continually under the investigations and 
inform the PTC should a genuine national proceeding make the case inadmissible.83 The 
PTC is the competent body to rule on admissibility.84 A ruling on admissibility can be 
appealed to the Appeals Chamber.85 
 
The Court was never intended to impose judicial dominance over working domestic legal 
systems adhering to the international rule of law, as the ICC does not have the authority to 
initiate proceedings when domestic proceedings are in accordance with the Rome Statute.86  
The principle of complementarity was a political trade-off made during the negotiations 
leading up to the adoption of the Rome Statute. This trade-off was necessary to receive the 
required amount of ratifications for the Statute to enter into force.87 The reason for 
including such a principle was to persuade states into giving the Court jurisdiction over 
certain crimes, while maintaining state sovereignty.88  
 
                                                
82 Rome Statute Art. 53 (1) litra (b). 
83 Rome Statute Art. 53 (2). 
84 Rome Statute Art. 17 (1), confer Art. 18. 
85 Rome Statute Art. 18 (4). 
86 Newton (2011) p. 307-308. 
87 Stigen (2005) p. 29. 
88 Cryer (2010)  p. 154. 
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Conversely, the ad-hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are not 
complementary to the respective national courts given the suspected lack of fair trials and 
capability (see also supra section 1.1.1). The Statutes for the ICTR and ICTY provide that 
while they recognise concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunals enjoy primacy over the national 
courts and may at any time “formally request national courts to defer to the competence” of 
the tribunals.89 In the Tadic case, the defence challenged the primacy of the ICTY. The 
Court rejected this challenge, holding that primacy would counter the danger that 
international crimes could be characterised as ordinary crimes, and thereby shielded by 
unfair national prosecution.90  
 
The principle of complementarity is on the one hand, founded on the respect for the 
sovereignty of the State, and on the other hand, a method of making international criminal 
prosecution more effective.91 Complementarity is practised by the ICC in two forms, a 
passive form and a positive form.92 The passive form is the traditional form, in which the 
Court remains passive until the State fails to investigate and prosecute. The positive form 
of complementarity, adopted and developed by the Prosecutor,93 is not only passive and 
reactive, but actively guides and encourages the national states to establish a working 
framework of legislation, thereby enabling the national states to prosecute international 
crimes domestically in accordance with the standards of the ICC. This will be further 
discussed in Section 5.1.1. 
                                                
89 ICTY Statute Art. 9 (2) and ICTR Statute Art. 8 (2). 
90 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 74.  
91 Cryer (2007) p. 127.  
92 The legal basis for positive complementarity can be found in Art. 93 (10) of the Rome 
Statute.  
93 Moreno-Ocampo (2011) p. 21. 
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3.2 Complementarity as a condition for admissibility  
Rome Statute Art. 17 (1) imposes three tests for admissibility to the court: the 
complementarity principle (litra (a) and (b)), a rule of double jeopardy (litra (c)) and an 
assessment of sufficient gravity of the crime (litra (d)).94 These will be examined 
separately, with a main focus on complementarity.  
3.2.1 Article 17 (1) litra (a) and (b) 
Complementarity can be said to serve three distinct purposes. First and foremost is the 
before-mentioned prevention of impunity. Second, to create a division of labour between 
the Court and national jurisdictions. Third, complementarity should ensure that State 
Parties effectively abide to the primary duty to investigate and prosecute international 
crimes.  
 
The principle of complementarity renders a case inadmissible if two cumulative criteria are 
met. First, the prosecuting State must have jurisdiction over the case. As mentioned in 
section 2.1 of this thesis, this includes universal jurisdiction. Second, the State must be both 
“willing” and “able” to genuinely investigate or prosecute the case.  
 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute states that the primary jurisdiction of a State can only be 
appealed if the State is considered “unwilling” to prosecute genuinely. According to Art. 17 
(2) litra (a) a State can be found ”unwilling” if domestic authorities are shielding a suspect 
from prosecution.95 A State can also be found “unable” to investigate or prosecute.96 The 
ordinary meaning of the words “unable” and “unwilling” indicates that there is a higher 
threshold for “unable” than “unwilling”. This is also supported by the definition of inability 
in Art. 17 (3), where it is stated that to determine inability, the Court must consider whether 
the State is unable to obtain the either the accused or evidence, or is otherwise unable to 
                                                
94 Triffterer (ed.) (2008) p. 606. 
95 Art. 17 (1) litra (a) and (b), c.f. (2) litra (a). 
96 Art. 17 (1) litra (a) and (b). 
 25 
carry out proceedings because of a collapse in the judicial system. “Unwilling” also implies 
a subjective element, reflected in the State’s policy.97 
 
One situation that may be considered “unwillingness” is where a State has genuinely 
exercised its jurisdiction, but on narrower grounds of material or mental elements of the 
crimes in its national legislation than is provided for in the Rome Statute.98 This could lead 
to de facto impunity since the crime is not punished domestically, but would have been 
prosecuted by the ICC, had the case been admissible. This may not be limited to blatant 
omissions of certain crimes, but one example could be where national legislation does not 
include the full range of crimes, such as Art. 7 (1) litra (g) regarding sexual offences or the 
use of child soldiers in Art. 8 (2).99  
 
Another form of “unwillingness” could be intended or unjustified delays in the 
proceedings.100 This could be due to a lack of impartiality and independence in the States’ 
prosecution. But delays or a lack of due process could only be considered “unwilling” if the 
delay as such is grave enough to be inconsistent with bringing the accused to justice.101 In 
this respect, a certain margin of appreciation must be given, due to the wide differences 
between the legal systems of different states. 
 
The text in Art. 17 does not explicitly mention “inactivity” as a condition for admissibility. 
This argues initially that inactivity does not satisfy the admissibility test. However, in the 
Lubanga case, the PTC ruled that “remained inactive” was equalled to “unwilling” and 
“unable” within the meaning of Art. 17 (1).102 The Pre-Trial Chamber further stated that the 
                                                
97 Stigen (2005) p. 119.  
98 Broomhall (2003) p. 91.  
99 Broomhall (2003) p. 92. 
100 Rome Statute Art. 17 (2) litra (b). See also Stigen (2005) p. 124.  
101 Stigen (2005) p. 128. 
102 Ibid. 
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inactivity must “encompass both the person and the conduct which are the subject of the 
case before the Court.103 In the Katanga case, the Court considered inactivity in the context 
of unwillingness, instead of adding it as a third unwritten criterion in addition to “unable” 
and “unwilling”.104 
 
Complementarity is a question the Court may need to revisit, as a State can affirm its 
jurisdiction even after the ICC proceedings have commenced. This can hypothetically open 
up for the possibility of using national proceedings to derail the ICC.105 However, the 
genuineness of the national proceedings must also be considered during a subsequent 
admissibility test. This was the issue in Kony case, where the Appeals Chamber of the ICC 
found that the case remained admissible because the Court found it speculative whether 
Kony could be tried in Uganda.106  
 
The word “genuinely” in litre (a) and (b) was chosen over the word “effectively” so that it 
would not be interpreted in such a way that a case would be admissible if the ICC could 
prosecute more effectively, i.e. that the national criminal proceedings were merely slow.107 
An ordinary meaning of the word “genuine” implies that it is something sincere, which can 
                                                
103 ICC-PTC Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Ntaganda. Decision on the Prosecutors 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58. ICC-01/04-01/07. 10 February 2006, para. 
29. See also Triffterer (ed.) (2008) p. 616. 
104 ICC-PTC Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui. Reasons for the Oral Decision on the 
Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case. 16 June 2009, para 77. See also 
Schabas (2011) p. 161. 
105 Cassese (2011) p. 534. 
106 ICC Appeals Chamber Prosecutor v. Kony et. al. Judgment on the appeal of the Defence 
against the "Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19 (1) of the Statute" of 
10 March 2009, paras 85-87. 
107 Cryer (2007) p. 128.  
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be interpreted as a purpose of bringing the accused to justice.108 This interpretation 
emphasises the State’s right and duty to prosecute, in accordance with the purpose of the 
Rome Statute as expressed in the Preamble. This interpretation also gives the states a wide 
margin of appreciation in selecting the measures for prosecuting. 
 
In both Art. 17 (1) litra (a) and (b) concerning jurisdiction the word “State” is used instead 
of “State Party,” indicating that any State may initiate an investigation or prosecution for 
the admissibility before the ICC. Second, the Rome Statute does not contain any rule of 
priority in between jurisdiction of different states, meaning that the ICC will have to yield 
if any State assumes genuine proceedings of a crime that otherwise fall in under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, so long as the State itself has jurisdiction over the matter.  
 
An objective interpretation of the term would indicate that it is referring to jurisdiction 
under international law, including universal jurisdiction.109 Interpreting Art. 17 (1) litra (a) 
and (b) in the light of the Preamble of the Rome Statute para 6, the duty to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction lies on “every State”. Hall argues that this must include every form of 
jurisdiction, as there are no explicit limitations on the form of jurisdiction mentioned in the 
Preamble.110 Such an interpretation would also be consistent with the purpose of the Rome 
Statute, as expressed in the Preamble, which is to end impunity.111 On the other hand, 
Stigen argues that the State must identify a positive rule under international law, treaty 
based or customary, allowing for universal jurisdiction over a crime. Stigen argues further 
that there must exist a positive rule, treaty based or customary, which an ICC crime is 
subject to.112  
 
                                                
108 Stigen (2005) p. 105. 
109 Stigen (2010) p. 136.  
110 Hall (2010) p. 211.  
111 Hall (2010) p. 212.  
112 Stigen (2008) p. 192.  
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Although there exists no formal hierarchy between the admissibility criteria of 
complementarity, double jeopardy and gravity, the Pre-Trial Chamber used 
complementarity as the first part of the test when testing the application’s admissibility in 
the Lubanga case.113 
3.2.2 Ne bis in idem 
The rule of ne bis in idem, or double jeopardy, in Art. 17 (1) litra (c) supports the principle 
of complementarity. A case is inadmissible to the ICC if the person has already been tried 
before another court. This is also a general rule of law accepted in most national legal 
systems.114 The same principle can also be found in other international human rights 
treaties, such as ICCPR Art. 14 (7) and ECHR Protocol No. 7 Art. 4. This admissibility 
criterion is linked with the subject matter of the ne bis in idem rule in Art. 20 (3). The rule 
applies only if the conduct the person is accused of is identical to the national proceedings. 
What constitutes same conduct will be examined in Section 4.3 and 4.4.   
 
One exemption from the ne bis in idem-principle can be found in Art. 84 (1) of the Rome 
Statute. This article provides that a revision of the final Judgment of conviction or sentence 
can be made on the grounds of new evidence, that decisive evidence has been proven false, 
or that one of the judges committed an act of serious misconduct. 
3.2.3 Sufficient gravity 
Article 17 (1) litra (d) of the Rome Statute imposes “sufficient gravity” as an admissibility 
criterion. Even if the crime were otherwise admissible, it must also be of a “sufficient 
gravity” to be prosecuted by the Court. Neither the Rome Statute nor the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence define “gravity”. 
 
                                                
113 ICC Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Ntaganda supra note 103 para. 30. 
114 Triffterer (ed.) (2008) p. 619.  
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In the Lubanga case, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered the gravity test mandatory,115 by 
interpreting the phrase “shall determine” in Art. 17 (1). It is the conduct subject to 
prosecution that must be “especially grave”.116 In both the Lubanga and the Ntaganda 
cases, the PTC considered two factors that could constitute “especially grave”: that the 
conduct was of a systematic or large scale and the amount of international concern caused 
in the international community.117 In the Ntaganda case, the conduct was found to be 
inadmissible due to a lack of gravity, but was later overturned by the Appeals Chamber of 
the ICC. The Appeals Chamber refused the consideration of international concern, but did 
not elaborate further on the merits of gravity.118 
 
Sufficient gravity reserves for the Court only the most serious of crimes committed, which 
underpins the complementarity principle.  
3.3 Prosecutorial discretion 
In addition to complementarity, a second aspect of admissibility is the prosecutorial 
discretion given to the Office of the Prosecutor. According to Art. 53 (1) litra (c) and (2) 
litra (c) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor is permitted to investigate a situation, and 
prosecute an individual, only if it serves the “interests of justice”. Although a legal 
criterion, this allows for considerable political maneuvering.119 Judicial control by the 
Court is applied only if the Prosecutor decides not to prosecute solely on this basis.120 The 
                                                
115 ICC Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Ntaganda supra note 103 para 41-45. 
116 Ibid. 
117 ICC Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Ntaganda supra note 103 para 46. 
118 ICC Appeals Chamber Prosecutor v. Lubanga. Judgment on the Prosecutor's appeal 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision Establishing General 
Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence". 13 October 2006. ICC-01/04-01/06-568, para 42.  
119 Stigen (2005) p. 2. 
120 Rome Statute Art. 53 (1) - (3). See also Greenawalt (2009) p. 133.  
 30 
gravity of a case,121 serves as an important factor for determining whether a case serves 
“the interests of justice”.122 Other factors for interpreting the “interests of justice” may be 
the interests of the victims of the crime and the case’s potential impact on a domestic peace 
process or other justice mechanisms.123
                                                
121 Rome Statute Art. 17 (1) litra (d). 
122 Stigen (2005) p. 98. 
123 ICC-OTP (2007) p. 6-8.  
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4 The tension between complementarity and sovereignty  
This Chapter will discuss some general issues that may be argued to create friction in the 
relationship between the ICC and domestic investigations and prosecutions, hereunder 
universal jurisdiction. This allows the more specific discussion in the next Chapter to be 
put in its context of the tension between universality and sovereignty. 
4.1 Principal differences in the site of trial 
The primary site for a trial is locus delicti, the place of the crime. In the course of history, 
this has been the norm for post-conflict justice. There are also several valid arguments for 
preferring a case to be held before a national court instead of an international court. One 
important factor is that the victims live or lived in the State where the crime was 
committed. Cost-efficiency of the prosecution will almost certainly be higher if the 
proceedings are held before a court in the State in which the criminal acts occurred.124 This 
is because of the lesser amount of resources needed to physically procure witnesses and 
collect evidence. Another advantage of having trials against international crimes in the 
respective domestic location is the focus on the individual perpetrator, rather than having 
the impression that the State is being punished. This loss of sovereignty in criminal 
proceedings leads to a form of international shaming, which may be a political cost for the 
State. Additionally, national proceedings often enjoy greater legitimacy in the society 
where the crimes took place as they come from within the society itself. Especially in 
poorer societies, national proceedings will have a greater impact on the community 
compared to the lack of media and information about international proceedings and the 
institutional distance between the society and the ICC or tribunal, a key argument in post-
                                                
124 Sands (2003) p. 81.  
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conflict Rwanda.125 National proceedings can also help in this way to promote 
reconciliation in a post-conflict society.126  
 
International crimes can have a vast scale, and resources are often limited post-conflict. If 
the territorial State where the crimes was comitted is unable to apply post-conflict justice, 
because the State is unable or unwilling ito hold trial, or because the perpetrators have fled, 
one alternative is to initiate criminal proceedings by investigating or prosecuting in another 
State. There has traditionally been little interest for prosecuting foreign individuals for 
crimes committed with no nexus to the neutral State. Often there is at least a colonial tie to 
the states afflicted, as in the cases of the Guatemala Genocide in Spain and the Batare Four 
in Belgium. This lack of interest for serving universal interests proves that trials for 
international crimes in neutral states are somewhat utopian.  
 
The third alternative is to hold the trial at the ICC in Hague. This alternative serves 
neutrality and independence, and is important for minimizing the feeling of victor’s justice. 
However, at the same time, the institutional and geographic distance between the victims 
and the Court might fail to contribute to their feelings of participation in post-conflict 
justice. The Court is also dependant on compliance from the states involved to secure 
evidence and vitnesses, and to apprehend the indicted.  
4.2 Self-referrals 
One of the three initial trigger mechanisms for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction is the state 
referral.127 Art. 14 allow “a State Party” to refer a situation to the prosecutor for 
investigation. State referrals can be regarding other states or a self-referral, where a State 
Party refers a situation where the crimes have been committed in its own territory or by its 
                                                
125 Wielenga (2011) p. 15. 
126 Broomhall (2003) p. 84. 
127 Rome Statute Art. 13 litra (a) and Art. 14. The other two trigger mechanisms are a 
referral by the UN Security Council in Art. 13 litra (b), and the Prosecutor’s independent 
initiation of investigation (proprio motu) in Art. 13 litra (c) and Art. 15.    
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own subjects.128 A self-referral to the ICC is made when the State considers that 
prosecuting a specific matter in a national court would be politically harmful to national 
interests and therefore claims an inability to investigate and prosecute the matter.129 The 
principle of complementarity might therefore come into conflict with certain aspects of the 
use of self-referrals. Self-referrals can potentially be used to shield political interests from 
domestic prosecution. One question relevant in this study is to which extent the 
complementarity principle allows for states that may be able and willing to investigate and 
prosecute situations themselves to refer to the ICC. Another aspect of this question will be 
discussed in Section 5.1.3. 
 
Today, international crimes are not necessarily perpetrated by states, but rather often by 
insurgents, like the LRA in Uganda, or by terrorist groups. States can therefore be both 
perpetrators and victims, and the ability of self-referral is therefore an important tool for 
failed states unable to prosecute crimes that fall under their jurisdiction. This is especially 
important where the society is deeply divided, as in Uganda and Rwanda. 
 
As of today, three self-referrals, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and the 
Central African Republic, have resulted in an ICC investigation.130 The Prosecutor, as a 
matter of enhancing the legitimacy of the early investigations, has welcomed the use of 
self-referrals. For example in the case of the DRC, it was argued that the Prosecutor 
preferred a state referral to exercising his own independent power of investigation.131 
 
Self-referrals can be interpreted in two different ways. A narrow interpretation of Art. 14 in 
the context of complementarity would lead to inadmissibility if the State itself is able and 
                                                
128 Stahn (ed.) (2009) p. xvii.  
129 Kleffner (2009) p. 42. 
130 ICC. Situations and cases. Available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations  Last accessed: 13/02/12.  
131 Akhavan (2005) p. 406. 
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willing to investigate.132 This was the reasoning of the defence counsel in the Katanga 
case.133 A positive interpretation would on the other hand allow for admissibility by self-
referral if the ICC is not in competition with the domestic prosecution. Given that the 
objective for the complementarity principle is to be an incentive for national proceedings, it 
therefore favours a positive interpretation of self-referrals.134 In this way, potential ICC 
proceedings could also act as an incentive for states to exercise their jurisdiction.135 
 
Assuming that the Rome Statute allows for a positive interpretation of state referrals, the 
next question is whether self-referrals act as waivers of complementarity for the 
admissibility of a case. If the State itself wishes for the ICC to prosecute, it seems plausible 
that the test for admissibility is redundant. However, such waivers of complementarity 
would be inconsistent with the right of the Prosecutor to investigate other or additional 
persons than the referral of the situation indicates.136 Should the Prosecutor indict 
additional persons, the admissibility would have to be tried for the cases in the subsequent 
indictment. For the sake of consistency, the rule should apply to the original self-referral as 
well. Kleffner argues that there exists no room for such waivers at the present.137  
 
Waiving complementarity by self-referring situations would also be counter-effective as an 
incentive for the right and duty of states to act as primary prosecutors of international 
crimes.138 The State could easily divert proceedings by referring the case to the ICC. 
                                                
132 Ibid. p. 413. 
133 ICC Appeals Chamber Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui. Judgment on the Appeal of 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the 
Admissibility of the Case, paras 61-64. See also Akhavan (2011) p. 290. 
134 VCLT Art. 31 (1). 
135 Kleffner (2009) p. 41.  
136 Rome Statute Art. 53 (1). See also Kleffner (2009) p. 44.  
137 Ibid. p. 43-44.  
138 Kleffner (2009) p. 45.  
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Submitting auto-referrals to a complementarity test for admissibility also reduces the 
incentive to use ICC referrals for domestic political gains. This was the case in the referral 
in the Situation in Uganda, where Uganda referred the leaders of the LRA insurgents only, 
despite the conflict being two-sided.139 Without the possibility of striking out cases that are 
politically motivated on grounds of admissibility, the Court could end up as a hostage in a 
domestic political situation.140  
 
The Appeals Chamber has come a long way towards clarifying the extent in which self-
referrals are permissible under the Rome Statute. The decision in the Katanga case 
established that self-referrals are consistent with the object and purpose of the ICC, which 
is to end impunity for international crimes.141 It is therefore permissible to self-refer 
situations where the State is willing and able to process, but the Court reserves a right to 
test for admissibility.   
4.3 Prosecution of ordinary crimes 
International crimes under the Rome Statute Art. 5 (1) subsumes elements which also 
constitutes as crimes in domestic criminal codes. Prosecution of ordinary crimes can 
therefore try the same conduct as a international trial. However, there is a chance that 
prosecution of ordinary crimes fail to address all the aspects of the crime as identified in 
the Rome Statute. The next question is therefore, to which extent can domestic prosecution 
of ordinary crimes fulfil the complementarity principle?142  
 
Rome Statute Art. 17 (1) litra c provides that a case is inadmissible if “the person 
concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint”. This 
applies to the crimes listed under Art. 6 through Art. 8 of the Rome Statute. If the person 
has been finally convicted or acquitted for a specific conduct, a re-trial is prohibited, 
                                                
139 ICC (2004) para 1. 
140 Kleffner (2009) p. 53.  
141 Akhavan (2011) p. 285. 
142 Sedman (2010) p. 259. 
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without consideration of the adequacy of the domestic punishment.143 This is an expression 
of the so-called ne bis in idem-principle.144 
 
One implication of the ne bis in idem-principle is that international prosecution of the same 
conduct as previously tried in a domestic trial is prohibited. For example, trying a specific 
count of murder, perpetrated within the context of an international crime, would be 
prohibited when the person had already been tried in his home country or in a neutral State. 
However, by separating the crime from the specific conduct, international prosecution 
could occur without breaching the obligation not to prosecute the same conduct.145 For 
instance in the case of murder, one could imagine the ICC prosecuting a hypothetical 
proceeding rape or for a second count of murder, if it fits within the context of an 
international crime.  
 
The Lubanga case has provided some factors for interpreting this question. One of the 
admissibility questions was whether the national investigations carried out by the DRC 
precluded the ICC’s jurisdiction under Art. 17 (1) litra a.146 In 2006, the Pre-Trial Chamber  
found that DRC national judicial system had changed in 2004 and since then two arrest 
warrants for Lubanga had been issued, some of which could be for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and that the DRC was therefore no longer “unable” to prosecute, 
as the Prosecutor stated in 2004. However, the PTC decided that the national proceedings 
did not “encompass the conduct that constitutes the basis of the Prosecution’s 
Application”.147 The Court reasoned that the DRC arrest warrants did not encompass the 
responsibility for conscripting and using child soldiers, and therefore the DRC was not 
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“acting in relation to the specific case before the Court”.148 This indicates a somewhat 
narrow interpretation of the principle of ne bis in idem, as the specific conduct is separated 
from the crime as a whole. A similar interpretation of the principle can be found in ICTY 
jurisprudence, where crimes in separate villages were found to be separate conduct, and 
that the ne bis in idem-principle only applied for crimes committed in the village of 
Glogova on 9 May 1992.149  
 
Domestic prosecution of ordinary crimes can therefore to a certain extent fulfil the 
complementarity principle in Art. 17, on the condition that the domestic prosecution 
encompass the specific conduct in the specific case before the ICC. This applies both to the 
State with territorial or personal jurisdiction, and states prosecuting based on universal 
jurisdiction.  
4.4 Horizontal complementarity 
The principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute imposes a vertical causal 
relationship between national proceedings of any State and the ICC. Horizontally, Article 
90 of the Rome Statute imposes a priority rule for a State Party who is in custody of a 
person suspected of international crimes when it receives competing requests for 
extradition between a State Party and the ICC in accordance with Art. 89. Art. 90 of the 
Rome Statute also distinguish between competing requests from a State Party and a non-
State Party; however, this is limited to extraditions only. For situations regarding 
jurisdiction, and extraditions outside of the jurisdiction of the Court, the Rome Statute is 
naturally silent regarding regulating claims of concurrent jurisdictions between different 
states. As there exists no principle for interpreting a hierarchy among concurrent forms of 
jurisdiction in treaty law, the next relevant question for this study is therefore to which 
extent there exists such a principle in customary international law.150 
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When multiple states claim to have jurisdiction to prosecute an international crime, some 
will have a stronger nexus to the crime than others. An example of this can be where a 
State exercising universal jurisdiction is in custody of a foreign alleged offender, but the 
territorial State or the State of which the offender is a national, also wishes to prosecute. 
Horizontal complementarity refers to a situation when a third-party State that wants to 
prosecute based on universal jurisdiction, are required to defer its prosecution in favour of a 
State with a stronger nexus with the international crime. One condition is that the State 
with the stronger nexus is able and willing to investigate and prosecute.  
 
A classic interpretation of international law is that states have a wide measure of 
appreciation when it comes to jurisdiction. However, limits to this margin of appreciation 
may exist and states may be obligated to restrain the exercise of their jurisdiction.151 This 
Westphalia-based system of sovereign equality was emphasized in the SS Lotus case.152 
Furthermore, there must exist some positive rule for limiting the sovereign right for states 
to exercise the jurisdiction they hold.153  
 
Undermining a potential principle of horizontal complementarity is the lack of a 
transnational ne bis in idem-principle.154 This principle has been codified in human rights 
treaties such as the ICCPR Art. 14 (7) and ECHR Protocol No. 7 Art. 4, however it is not 
considered applicable at a transnational level when universal jurisdiction is applied.155  
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One factor that may support the argument that states consider themselves bound by a 
customary rule is the degree of domestic legislation implementing a rule of horizontal 
complementarity. Germany and Belgium are two countries which have codified a principle 
of horizontal complementarity into their national criminal codes.156 To a certain degree, 
there exists some relevant case law on this specific subject. 
 
One case that has been used as an example of horizontal complementarity is the 2005 
German Abu Graib case. The question there was whether the respective German court 
could prosecute alleged international crimes committed by American military personnel. 
The German federal prosecutor applied Art. 17 directly as a form of subsidiary universal 
jurisdiction. The prosecutor could then apply a rule of prosecutorial discretion in the 
German Code of Criminal Procedure, where prosecution of a suspect of international 
crimes can be suspended if another State is prosecuting and is exercising jurisdiction based 
on the territoriality, nationality or passive personality principle. The reason for this was to 
end proceedings, because the situation had been dealt with in the United States.157 The 
1994 Tadic case in also indicated a will to defer to other jurisdictions with a stronger nexus 
to the crime, although it deferred to an international tribunal and not a prosecution based on 
universal jurisdiction.158  
 
Many states are dualistic, meaning international law has to be domestically enacted in order 
to be given effect in the domestic legal system. Some are also purely monist, incorporating 
all treaties by simply ratifying them. But most states can be considered a combination, 
giving some treaty provisions direct effect. One example of this is New Zealand, which has 
sector monism for ICC crimes, giving the relevant provisions direct effect based on 
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universal jurisdiction.159 However, Art. 17 is a procedural rule relating to ICC-specific 
competences and, therefore, giving direct effect to Art. 17 in domestic law would be 
problematic de lege ferenda. For the principle to be applicable in domestic legislation, the 
substantial principle of complementarity would have to be lifted out of the procedural rule, 
and then implemented domestically.  
 
In the case of Belgium v. Senegal, the dispute was due to a lack of prosecution by Senegal 
of former President of Chad, Hissene Habré.160 Habré had fled to Senegal in 1990 and was 
accused of being responsible for torture and political killings. Senegal failed to prosecute 
Habré and refused to extradite him to Belgium based on a lack of jurisdiction. Belgium saw 
this as a violation of Art. 5 (2) of the Torture Convention in failing to incorporate the 
necessary provisions to enable Senegal to prosecute based on universal jurisdiction, a 
violation of Art. 6 (2) regarding preliminary inquiries, and a violation of Art. 7 (1) 
regarding prosecution or extradition of any person alleged to have committed torture.161 
Belgium therefore primarily asked that the ICJ order Senegal to submit the case to its 
competent authorities and subsequently demanded extradition to another jurisdiction.162 At 
the time of writing, the ICJ has yet to rule in the case; however, the questions in the hearing 
regarding the erga omnes right to enforce the Torture Conventions obligations by any State 
based on universal jurisdiction when another State have a stronger jurisdictional claim 
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based on the physical presence of the defendant, may shed light on the applicability of a 
potential customary principle of horizontal complementarity.163 
 
In Spain, the 2000 Guatemala Genocide case provided support for arguing that there 
existed a rule of horizontal complementary in Spanish legislation. The Audiencia Nacional 
court reasoned that universal jurisdiction was complementary to territorial jurisdiction, and 
found that Guatemala could not be found unwilling to investigate and prosecute the 
massacre.164 The Court based its holding on an interpretation of the Genocide Convention 
Art. 6 and consideration of the subsidiary principle found here to be a part of a jus cogens 
rule of horizontal complementarity for universal jurisdiction. The amendment of the 
Spanish Organic Law of the Judicial Branch165 in 2009 narrowed the general applicability 
of universal jurisdiction in Spain by requiring a specific interest for prosecution based on 
universal jurisdiction, although it cannot be considered to narrow the findings of a principle 
of horizontal complementarity in Spain. 
 
Germany, Spain and Belgium are three examples of states that find a principle of horizontal 
complementarity desirable, even if they do not presently consider it binding on state 
practice.166 There are several examples of national proceedings in Spain with little or no 
regard to the stronger nexus to the crime, or willingness in investigating and prosecuting in 
other states.167 One such example is the indictments of Rwandan officials in 2008, where it 
was believed that because of the strong ties the suspects had to the sitting government, 
Rwanda would not prosecute willingly. Another example can be found in the investigations 
                                                
163 ICJ Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal). 
Oral Proceedings. 16 March 2012. CR 2012/5, p. 41.  
164 Audiencia Nacional. Criminal Chamber, Plenary Session. Appeal Record 115/2000. 
Decision, 13 December 2000.  
165 2009 Judiciary Act (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) (Spain). 
166 Ryngaert (2010b) p. 23. 
167 Ibid. p. 24.  
 42 
after the Israeli bombing of a Palestinian residential building in 2002, where the Spanish 
judge disregarded the Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling in the matter.168 It is be therefore be 
tempting to conclude that a dismissal of a matter often leads to a conclusion of 
unwillingness in the third party state. 
 
International case law has yet to rule on the matter. In the 2002 ICJ Arrest Warrant case, 
the joint separate opinion of Judges Burgenthal, Higgins and Kooijmans referred to a 
principle of horizontal complementarity.169 The principle was not further elaborated, and 
because the majority opinion of the ICJ only addressed immunity in the merits of the case, 
the referral to the principle of horizontal complementarity must be seen as an obiter dictum. 
Because of the omission of the question of horizontal complementarity on the merits of the 
case, the question is considered to be  undecided. 
 
In the 2003 application to the ICJ by the DRC, one of the claims was that the exercising of 
universal jurisdiction based on the UN Torture Convention Art. 5 (2) was complementary 
to the exercising of territorial or active/passive personality jurisdiction based on Art. 5 
(1).170 As the parties came to an agreement in 2010, there is no ruling on the merits of 
horizontal complementarity.171  
 
The limited case-law indicates a lack of state practice. It must be granted that customary 
law have previously been established on a thin basis, if the opinio juris is consistent.172 But 
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in the case of the traditionally coherent view on limiting jurisdiction in international law, 
strong arguments in favour of horizontal complementarity must be made for it to be 
considered customary law. It is therefore instead regarded as a principle of which 
prosecuting states can consider. As discussed infra in Section 5.2, giving this principle too 
much weight can create unwanted consequences.  
 
There are albeit no compelling reasons de lege ferenda for different standards for 
competing jurisdictions with the ICC and third party states. This argument is further 
underpinned if the third party states are State Parties to the ICC. However, it is not clear 
that this is a consistently wanted development and that states feel obligated to adhere to 
such a principle, and opinio juris has not been proven cohesive on the subject. In 
conclusion, there exists no principle of horizontal complementarity in customary 
international law. 
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5 Universal jurisdiction and complementarity as catalysts? 
This Chapter will first examine the role the principle of complementarity can have as a 
catalyst for national proceedings, hereunder the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Section 
5.2 and infra will examine the relevance and potential universal jurisdiction presently have 
in the context of the ICC complementarity regime, and then in Section 5.2.1 – 5.2.3 discuss 
issues that acts as obstacles for universal jurisdiction to complement the impunity gaps in 
the ICC regime.   
5.1 Complementarity as a catalyst for universal jurisdiction 
5.1.1 Positive complementarity as an incentive for national proceedings 
The principle of complementarity was intended to act as an incentive for national 
proceedings, partly by restraining the sovereignty of those states that do not genuinely 
prosecute international crimes themselves. This “sovereignty cost” functions as a positive 
incentive for those countries to prosecute.173 The “sovereignty cost” is a form of political 
shaming, used when states measure the political and financial costs and benefits of 
domestic and international prosecution of crimes. One way for the ICC to manipulate this 
cost-analysis is to reduce the cost of domestic prosecution by enabling the domestic legal 
system to prosecute international crimes through practical assistance and legislative help, 
the process of positive complementarity.174 One relevant question is therefore to what 
extent positive complementarity can contribute to national proceedings. 
 
 A basic form of positive complementarity includes legal training and adaptation of 
domestic law, as was done in Uganda to help national prosecution of crimes committed 
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during the conflict between the government and the LRA.175 This is reinforced by the 
legitimacy the complementarity principle enjoys as it reaffirms the sovereignty of states.176 
The principle of complementarity therefore, gives national proceedings a distinction of 
willingness and ability.177 Another way could be to increase the political cost of 
international prosecution, for example through public threats of prosecution where states 
linger. It is however not certain that the stick would be preferable to the carrot in this case, 
as the Prosecutor has shown himself to rely on state cooperation. 
 
According to Art. 93 (10) litra (a) of the Rome Statute, the Court may cooperate and assist 
State Parties that investigate or prosecute crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. The Office 
of the Prosecutor has adapted this into the principle of positive complementarity. For 
example, should two or more states wish to prosecute a specific case, the Office of the 
Prosecutor, acting in accordance with the principle of positive complementarity, may assist 
states in determining who is the most appropriate to take jurisdiction.178 Positive 
complementarity includes enabling states to utilize universal jurisdiction.179 
 
At the present, the Prosecutor’s interpretation of positive complementarity has focused on 
measures such as providing information to national judiciaries upon request, calling upon 
legal professionals from countries with situations under ICC investigations to participate in 
ICC-OTP investigations, providing information for other parties such as the UN, and 
promoting support for accountability efforts by other external parties such as donors’ 
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conferences.180 Judicial cooperation with State Parties is limited to fostering adoption of 
domestic legislation in the State Parties.181  
 
The usage of positive complementarity by the Office of the Prosecutor may therefore act as 
a potential, although limited, incentive for national proceedings.  
5.1.2 Article 18 (1) as an incentive for national proceedings 
The Rome Statute emphasises the “duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes”.182 According to Art. 18 (1) of the Rome 
Statute, the Prosecutor is required to notify all State Parties and those states that “normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned” if he is to initiate an investigation. This 
applies only to referrals by a State Party183 or when the Prosecutor is acting on his own 
initiative.184 This provides the states concerned with an incentive to investigate 
international crimes at the earliest opportunity possible.185  In some cases, non-State Parties 
may also be interested in exercising universal jurisdiction. One question relevant to this 
study is whether the Prosecutor is obligated to notify non-State Parties about pending 
investigations.  
 
Notification on non-State Parties will only be applicable if they “normally” would exercise 
jurisdiction, based on the wording in Art. 18 (1). An example of this would be a subject of 
a non-State Party that commits a crime that falls under the jurisdiction of the Court while in 
the territory of a State Party. Such a notification would therefore act as a direct incentive 
for the use of universal jurisdiction by non-State Parties in the complementarity regime.  
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Interpreting the relevant text in the Rome Statute Art. 18 (1) in its ordinary meaning, the 
use of the word “and those States” instead of “including those States” indicates a 
distinction between the two groups of states concerned.186 This interpretation is also 
supported by the fact that any State with jurisdiction over a case, including non-State 
Parties based on universal jurisdiction, can challenge the Courts proceedings.187 Support of 
this argument is also found in the draft proposal to the Rome Statute, limiting the right to 
challenge the admissibility of a case to interested states only.188 An alternative 
interpretation would be to give the word “and” meaning as “especially”. However, there are 
no other indications that the Rome Statute is precluded from encompassing non-State 
Parties in this matter.  
 
If one assumes that Art. 18 (1) includes non-State Parties, the next question is what 
constitutes a “normal” exercise of jurisdiction. The use of the word “normal” indicates a 
more narrow interpretation of jurisdiction than the one found in Art. 17 (1).189 One 
interpretation of what constitutes “normal exercise” of jurisdiction is that the non-State 
Party has a territorial- or active/passive personality-connection to the crime.190 This 
interpretation can give the rule a very narrow area of application, as territorial jurisdiction 
cannot apply to non-State Parties without a UN Security Council referral or an ad-hoc 
acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction.191 On the other hand, if one assumes that this rule 
would be most applicable for situations where a subject of a non-State Party commits a 
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crime while on the territory of a State Party, then this interpretation of a “normal” exercise 
of jurisdiction would be fruitful. Another example may be where an investigated person has 
taken refuge in a non-State Party, leaving the non-State Party with the option to extradite or 
prosecute based on universal jurisdiction. 
 
Until this question is brought before the ICC, it will be impossible to conclude on a definite 
answer. However, some points shown suggest that the Prosecutor is obligated to notify 
non-State Parties that have a certain nexus to a specific situation or case, for example 
territorial or based on active or passive personality, or if the investigated person is based in 
the territory of the non-State Party.  
5.1.3 An obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction? 
Along with adopting the Rome Statute, several states have incorporated the subject matter 
provisions as expressed in Art. 5 (1), into domestic law.192 It is however unclear whether 
the Rome Statute establishes an obligation to exercise mandatory universal jurisdiction for 
international crimes, provided that the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC.193 One 
condition for an obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction is that there exists a principle 
of mandatory universal jurisdiction for the international crime, for example through 
customary international law or treaty, such as Art. 5 (2) of the Torture Convention. This 
question is also relevant for the jurisdiction over nationals of non-State Parties, which is 
examined in the next section of this study. 
 
The Preamble of the Rome Statute recalls the duty of “every State” to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction, including implicit universal jurisdiction. While the Preamble must be 
considered integral to the main body of the Statute,194 there exists no additional legal 
requirements for this duty. It is therefore difficult to conclude on a specific obligation to 
exercise universal jurisdiction based on the Rome Statute. According to the ICJ, the Rome 
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Statute “does not prohibit universal jurisdiction”.195 It can also be noted that the Preamble 
uses the words “every State” and not “every State Party,” indicating that the duty towards 
exercising criminal justice is not geographically limited to signatories. However, VCLT 
Art. 34 prohibit a treaty from imposing obligations on third-party states, as far as.  
 
Kleffner argues that Art. 17 does not in any way affect the pre-existing regime of universal 
jurisdiction with regard to international crimes. It is therefore reasonable to argue that Art. 
17 neither prohibit nor creates an obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction for State 
Parties.  
 
The Preamble does not restrict “criminal jurisdiction” to any form of jurisdiction. Since 
universal jurisdiction is one of the five traditional forms of jurisdiction in international law, 
an obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction implicitly exists in the Preamble. Hall 
argues that a teleological interpretation of Art. 21 (1) litra (b) of the Rome Statute, together 
with VCLT Art. 31 and the normative nature of the Rome Statute, favours the broadest 
interpretation for protection of victims. The obligations of states should therefore not be 
restricted by interpretation. This interpretation would also be consistent with the obligation 
to interpret the Rome Statute in accordance with human rights.  
 
The Preamble arguably incorporates an obligation for State Parties to exercise universal 
jurisdiction where it is applicable for international crimes, although it is a vague obligation 
that proscribes few legal requirements to be invoked.   
5.1.4 Nationals of Non-State Parties 
The question that follows the potential obligation to exercise jurisdiction is how the ICC 
and states prosecuting based on universal jurisdiction differ regarding nationals of non-
State Parties. If a national of a non-State Party is suspected of international crimes, the ICC 
might be left without jurisdiction. Exemptions from this general rule are when the UN 
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Security Council refers the situation to the Court,196 when the non-State Party whose 
national is suspected have given the Court an ad-hoc jurisdiction,197 or when the crime was 
committed on the territory of a State Party.198 One question, therefore, is to what degree 
universal jurisdiction can be used to compensate for this potential lack of jurisdiction over 
nationals of non-State Parties. Exercising universal jurisdiction in this given scenario is 
consistent with the principal aim of the Rome Statute, to end impunity.   
 
China, especially, has raised concern for the ICC jurisdiction over non-State Party 
nationals.199 This is partly because the Court itself decides what will constitute as “unable” 
or “unwilling,” leaving the final answer to the question of admissibility to the Court. The 
United States has argued that exercise of ICC jurisdiction over US nationals (i.e. nationals 
of all non-State Parties) would be contrary to international law and VCLT Art. 34 
specifically provides that a treaty may not impose obligations on third-party states without 
consent.200  
 
Akande argues that the State Party which is in custody of a national of a non-State Party 
may delegate its jurisdiction to the ICC. ICC jurisdiction over nationals of non-State Parties 
also appears to be inconsistent with the ICJ decision in the Monetary Gold case.201 There, 
the ICJ held that a case was inadmissible if adjudicating the rights and obligations of a 
third-party state was necessary for the case to be decided. However, the Rome Statute does 
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not impose obligations on third-party States as such, only individuals.202 Scharf also argues 
that individual criminal responsibility must be interpreted not to impose obligations on the 
State, but on the individual, and that VCLT Art. 34 therefore cannot be applied.203 
 
If the suspected perpetrator of an international crime is in the custody of a State Party, but 
he is a national of a non-State Party, he might also be prosecuted under universal 
jurisdiction for international crimes. This situation can, for example, be relevant where the 
suspected perpetrator is seeking refuge in another country than where the crime was 
committed, as in the Belgium v. Senegal case.204 It can be incoherent if the State Party in 
such a situation is unable to delegate its jurisdiction to the ICC.  
 
If the suspect is in the custody of the ICC, the question is whether he can be extradited to a 
non-State Party based on universal jurisdiction. This situation does not fall under the core 
definition of extradition in Art. 102 litra (b) of the Rome Statute, as this only encompass 
extradition by a State. Art. 103 1 litra (a) provides that a sentenced person can be 
transferred to another State for the completion of a sentence. But in view of Art. 17 and 19 
(4), whereas a non-State Party can challenge the admissibility of a case, a successful 
challenge must result in the transfer of a suspect to a non-State Party.205      
5.2 Universal jurisdiction as a complement to the ICC? 
There have been approximately fifty relevant proceedings based on universal jurisdiction in 
Europe since 1998, with convictions in more than one fifth of the cases.206 Some have been 
watershed cases, such as the 2001 Butare Four case in Belgium, convicting four Rwandan  
nationals of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions during the 1994 Rwandan 
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Genocide.207 In its first ten years of operation, the ICC has investigated seven situations, 
and reached conviction in one case. The sheer amount of international crimes combined 
with the institutional capacity of the ICC is therefore an argument for universal jurisdiction 
to complement the ICC regime.  
 
Universal jurisdiction can potentially fill the gap of impunity where international crimes 
are not investigated by the national court and are inadmissible at the ICC. This would in 
many cases be because of a lack of gravity in the specific case. The ICC is not constructed 
to handle lower-level perpetrators, so if the State in which the crime took place is 
disinterested in prosecuting, then there will be an impunity gap, which universal 
jurisdiction has the potential to fill. This is especially true if the alleged perpetrator seeks 
refuge in another State.  
 
Investigations and prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction can also put a public 
spotlight on international crimes, as it did in the Pinochet proceedings.208 The hearings here 
had a definite impact on the attention universal jurisdiction and the issues of impunity 
received internationally. Although universal jurisdiction has gained attention for 
international crimes, the views on universal jurisdiction outside of Europe have often been 
quite negative. The African Union has been very critical towards the use of universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute suspects of acts of genocide in Rwanda.209 Wide differences 
between different domestic legal systems can reinforce this effect. In addition to this, 
prosecution based on universal jurisdiction have proven a tendency to run been between 
former colonial powers and their subjects.210 Another tendency has been to prosecute 
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subjects of African and South American nations.211 However, it must be admitted that  
most international crimes have been perpetrated in African conflicts. But it must also be 
noted the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the aftermath of the war in the Balkans.  
 
In addition, the preparatory work during the phase of investigation by State Parties 
asserting universal jurisdiction in absentia, can be a important contribution to the ICC.212 
Ryngaert argues that this could be considered as a duty under the Rome Statute, under 
which states are obliged to “cooperate fully” with the Court in its investigations and 
prosecutions.213 This obligation could be interpreted as including preparatory work in the 
earliest phases of an investigation. 
 
In the 2002 Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ narrowed the principle of universality 
significantly. By establishing that foreign ministers enjoy personal immunity ex officio, and 
that they may only be prosecuted for crimes committed while in office in a “private 
capacity,” the ICJ in effect narrowed the application of universal jurisdiction for 
prosecuting international crimes.214 While the interpretation on the law of immunity in the 
Arrest Warrant case led to a significant narrowing of the reach of universal jurisdiction, the 
ICJ did not define what constitutes “private capacity”. In addition to this, the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert argued that international crimes such as genocide and 
aggression are possible to commit only in a State capacity, and that immunity never should 
apply to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although the ICJ reserved the right to 
address the question of universal jurisdiction in the Arrest Warrant case, the Court did not 
address it in the merits of the case.215 This was due to Congo dropping the claim of 
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unlawful application of universal jurisdiction in its final submission. In the separate opinion 
of Judge Oda, it was highlighted that universal jurisdiction is an undeveloped field, and 
therefore the ICJ should not take “a definite stance” on the subject.216  
 
By differentiating between jurisdiction and admissibility, the ICC respects the sovereignty 
of its State Parties. Universal jurisdiction can, on the other hand, be considered a threat to 
sovereignty217, partly because of the lack of a principle of horizontal complementarity. 
 
Horizontal complementarity can be a factor for exercising universal jurisdiction without 
creating tension between universalism and sovereignty, as argued supra in Section 4.4. 
However, this principle can be given too much weight when domestic prosecutors apply 
universal jurisdiction. As the indictment of Rumsfeld and others for responsibility for 
torture shows, the German Federal Prosecutor deferred to a US investigation, based on the 
existence of other US proceedings of lower ranking individuals, and not directly related to 
the subject of the original indictment.218  Such an interpretation of horizontal 
complementarity leaves manoeuvring room for the home State to block foreign proceedings 
by initiating proceedings against lower-level officials.219  
 
One argument against universal jurisdiction to complement the ICC regime is that it can be 
criticized for being politically motivated and lacking the political impartialness that 
international tribunal can provide. The arrest warrant for the Israeli politician Tzipi Livni 
for responsibility for war crimes in Gaza was met with domestic political pressure.220 
However, one solution is to restrain the politization of universal jurisdiction, and to leave 
the power of prosecution to an politically independent prosecutor, such as the office of 
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Riksadvokaten in Norway and the newly established Director of Public Prosecution in the 
UK.221 Although this raises the bar for exercising universal jurisdiction, it restrains the 
potential political motivation, especially of private petitions.  
 
Universal jurisdiction has also been accused of following old colonial lines. But it is 
equally valid that most international crimes happen in failed states and poor countries, and 
that international prosecution is a predominantly Western phenomenon.222 Likewise, the 
prosecution at the ICC have also been criticized for taking political considerations into 
account regarding prosecution.223 The ICC has been proven to seek state cooperation, as the 
self-referrals of the situations in the DRC, Uganda and the Central African Republic have 
shown. The gravity criteria in Art. 17 (1) litra (d), in conjunction with the prosecutorial 
discretion based on the gravity of a crime in Art. 53 (1) litra (c) has also proven to be 
politically powerful. The extension of judicial priorities to enable the current use of the 
gravity threshold was unforeseen by the Rome Negotiations.224 The gravity threshold was 
used to justify the refusal to investigate the 2003 invasion in Iraq, despite receiving over 
200 communications regarding possible international crimes. Another development has 
been in the “contextual interpretation” of the gravity threshold in the Lubanga case, 
indicating that the conduct must be “especially grave” to be admissible.225 The 
development of the prosecutorial discretion in the ICC regime can affect the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, as it leaves a lesser amount of international crimes admissible for the 
ICC. Both the Court and the exercise of universal jurisdiction therefore exist in a political 
context where justice is dependant on power, self-interests and cooperation to be efficient.  
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5.2.1 Lack of positive domestic legislation 
The legislative basis of universal jurisdiction varies between states. Some states apply 
ordinary criminal law for the prosecution of international crimes, while other refer directly 
to international law through domestic criminal code.226  
 
In the first eight years after the Rome Statute’s entry into force, only 38 State Parties 
enacted legislation providing the core international crimes as crimes under national law, 
permitting national courts to exercise universal jurisdiction.227 It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to do a comparative analysis of these State’s legislation. Instead some examples are 
provided.  
 
In Belgium, Art. 5 (3) of the Act of 1993 Concerning Grave Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law provided that it was to be applied equally to all persons, disregarding 
any immunity. Thus Belgium could prosecute an acting minister of the DRC, in the 2000 
Arrest Warrant case. This act was amended in 2003, limiting the unconditional universal 
jurisdiction, by requiring a nexus of active or passive personality.228  
In Norway, the 2008 entry into force of Chapter 16 of the 2005 Penal Code gave 
Norwegian courts competence in cases regarding war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity.229 These crimes may be prosecuted on the basis of universal jurisdiction.230 The 
rationale was to give Norwegian courts the same competence as the ICC.231 But, there are 
in fact some limitations on the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The maximum punishment 
in the Norwegian Criminal Code must exeed one year, and the conduct must be punishable 
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in the territorial State. The accused must also reside in Norway.232 In 2006, before the entry 
into force of the new legislation, the ICTR requested the transfer of the case against Michel 
Bagaragaza from the tribunal to Norway to try him in Norway for genocide. This was later 
rejected by the ICTR as Norway’s legislation did not encompass jurisdiction over genocide 
based on universal jurisdiction. 
 
In Spain, universal jurisdiction legislation was amended in 2009 after the investigation 
regarding the 2002 bombings by Israel was closed (see Section 4.4).233 It is now required 
that the perpetrator is apprehended in Spain, or that the prosecution is based on the passive 
personality principle. The legislation also imposes that Spanish prosecution be suspended if 
proceedings are commenced in a State or international court or tribunal, thereby imposing a 
provision of horizontal complementarity.234 
 
In 2001, the UK enacted legislation extending universal jurisdiction over core international 
crimes, but limits this to persons living in the UK at the time of the crime or proceedings 
and excludes the crime of aggression.235 
 
Non-State Parties have also amended their legislation after the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute. In the United States, until 2007, the crime of torture was the only crime subject to 
universal jurisdiction. In 2008 and 2009, legislation was enacted providing for universal 
jurisdiction for genocide and the recruitment of child soldiers.236 In the case of United 
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States v. Yousef, a US Court of Appeals excluded terrorism as a subject of universal 
jurisdiction because it was unable to distinct the subject matter of the crime of terrorism.237 
 
For those countries that do allow investigation or prosecution based on universal 
jurisdiction, temporal and spatial restriction of universal jurisdiction often apply.238 For 
example, some countries require the presence of the suspect before investigations can 
commence or extradition can be requested.239 Although trials in absentia may be in conflict 
with human rights, a strict presence requirement like the one adopted in Belgium in 2009, 
may lead to limited applicability of universal jurisdiction. In addition, only a few states 
have special units that investigate crimes under international law. Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Norway are three examples of countries where units of the national 
prosecutors are specialized in international crimes.240 In other countries, especially France 
and Spain, the private petition continues to serve as the sole means for invoking universal 
jurisdiction.241 
5.2.2 The potential lack of due process in universal jurisdiction 
One of the non-jurisdictional issues regarding universal jurisdiction is the potential 
difficulty in safeguarding the human rights of the perpetrator. The ICC employs 
admissibility as an method of protecting the human rights of the accused. Because of the 
complementarity principle, the accused is free of multiple proceedings and double 
jeopardy. The missing safeguards, and therefore potential lack of a due process in universal 
jurisdiction, could come into conflict with international and regional human rights 
instruments such as the ECHR242 and the ICCPR.243 The right to a fair trial, issues 
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regarding trials in absentia, and the lack of a transnational ne bis in idem-principle are just 
a few examples (see Section 4.4). 
 
Repeated prosecution can happen, with the lack of a ne bis in idem-principle. As there 
exists no principle regulating repeated prosecutions between states, the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction would have to rely on the successive national courts to prevent 
repeated prosecution.244 The EU has implemented such a principle.245 A related issue is that 
the lack of a international ne bis in idem-principle can lead to forum shopping. The three 
European states most favourable towards exercising universal jurisdiction have 
traditionally been Belgium, Germany and Spain.  
 
For states who have codified universal jurisdiction in their national legislation, it can be 
implemented narrowly (conditionally) or extensively (unconditionally). An extensive 
implementation of universal jurisdiction would allow courts to rule in absentia, without the 
presence of the accused.246 According to the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 
ruling in absentia can only apply to pre-trial proceedings, without possibly violating the 
accused’s due process and human rights, for example the right to a fair trial, as expressed in 
ECHR Art. 6.247 The narrow or conditional form of universal jurisdiction is the most 
common, although some European states have opted for legislation, which allows for 
proceedings in absentia.248 For example, in Belgium, between 1993 and 2003, civil 
petitioners could initiate cases where no territorial link to Belgium existed. This led to 
cases against several sitting heads of State, such as Fidel Castro of Cuba and Ariel Sharon 
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of Israel.249 In Spain, a 2005 Constitutional Tribunal ruling interpreted Spanish jurisdiction 
such that proceedings in absentia could be carried out. This wide interpretation has later 
been amended to require proceedings based on the territorial principle and the active and 
passive personality principle, although only for future proceedings.250 
5.2.3 Amnesties and statutes of limitations  
One further question is how exercising universal jurisdiction differs from complementarity 
in relation to amnesties and statutes of limitations. This is relevant because of the tension 
exercising jurisdiction over crimes a State have given amnesty for, might create with that 
States’ sovereignty. Amnesties in some form are often part of the transitional justice 
process in a post-conflict society. Examples include the amnesties given by the 
Government to the LRA in Uganda,251 El Salvador, South Africa and Guatemala.252  
 
The Rome Statute Art. 29 provides that the jurisdiction of the ICC may be exercised 
regardless of statutes of limitations given in or after a conflict. On the other hand, the Rome 
Statute does not mention amnesties explicitly. If the national courts decide not to prosecute 
crimes, or to grant an amnesty, for example in combination with an official truth 
commission, then the test will be whether or not the national proceedings can be identified 
as “genuine unwillingness” and if the crimes are grave enough to warrant admissibility 
before the Court.253 The South African TRC and the Gacaca courts in Rwanda are two 
examples of hybrid transitional justice that have been found to constitute genuine 
prosecution. However, if an amnesty has been given, the Prosecutor may find that 
prosecution by the ICC is not in the “interests of justice”.254 The UN Security Council may 
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also request that the Court defer any proceedings, which can take into account the need for 
amnesty.255 
 
The use of amnesty was one of the principal questions regarding the admissibility of the 
Situation in Uganda.256 The question there was whether amnesty given to the LRA leaders 
by the Ugandan government could be considered a genuine willingness and ability to 
prosecute. The conditions of the amnesty included a public admitting of guilt and a public 
apology.257 In 2004, Uganda referred the case to the ICC and in 2005, the Court issued 
arrest warrants for the leaders of the LRA, including Joseph Kony.258 Uganda later wished 
to withdraw the arrest warrants and instead reverts to negotiations and amnesty. For the 
ICC to withdraw, the question is whether the investigations and prosecutions are 
“genuine”. Given that there is no definition of “prosecution” in Art. 17 of the Rome 
Statute, it is therefore unknown whether the traditional tribal justice combined with the 
amnesty will be defined as a genuine investigation and prosecution. Interpreting 
“prosecution” narrowly would obviously leave out Uganda’s traditional form of justice.259  
 
States prosecuting international crimes are not bound by domestic amnesties, as foreign law 
is not binding on another sovereign State. How states prosecuting based on universal 
jurisdiction relate to amnesties, is therefore up to the prosecutorial discretion in that State. 
States such as Spain and France hold that their prosecutions disregard foreign amnesties.260  
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In Uganda, the government set up a special war crimes court, the International Crimes 
Division,261 to prevent the LRA leaders from be tried before the ICC as agreed in the 
amnesty. This was done when the government learned that the ICC would disregard the 
Ugandan amnesty. In such a way, the threat of international prosecution, from the ICC or 
other states, can act as an disincentive for giving amnesty.     
 
For statutes of limitations, the 1968 UN Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and the 1974 European 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity 
and War Crimes, forbid the use of statutory limitations for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The European Convention has, at the present, been ratified by seven European 
states.262 The UN Convention has been ratified by 54 states.263 This indicates a very 
reserved international support of these treaties and does not indicate a definite rule. 
 
The Geneva Conventions and the Torture Convention impose mandatory universal 
jurisdiction (a duty to extradite or prosecute). This is hard to reconcile with blanket 
amnesties. Admittedly, Art. 6 (5) of the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions calls for the use of broad amnesty, but it is believed that this doesn’t apply for 
core international crimes. De lege ferenda one could argue that this threshold should be 
similar to the interpretation of the Rome Statute, in effect balancing the need for political 
manoeuvrability through amnesty and the need to prevent impunity for international 
crimes. Therefore the test of “genuine willingness to prosecute” could be also used against 
amnesties.  
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In summary, there exist no definite rules limiting the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
situations where an amnesty has been given, or for statutes of limitations. The ICC would 
in any case have to assess the “interests of justice”, in effect the political gains of the 
amnesty or statute of limitations, compared with the severity of the crime. Other sovereign 
states are not obligated to assess this issue, leaving the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
a situation where it can disturb a fragile peace process.264   
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6 Concluding remarks 
The rationale behind establishing a permanent international criminal court was to end 
impunity and to ensure that the statement “never again” would not once more become the 
reality of “again and again”.265 The principle of complementarity has arguably contributed 
to a increase in prosecution of international crimes;266 however, the Court has only begun 
to utilize the all the provisions in the Rome Statute, meaning it is too early to measure all 
the effects of the complementarity principle in its fullest extent. How the complementarity 
principle is to actually work, was left to be fleshed out by practice. In addition, exercising 
universal jurisdiction can be relevant because of the limits of the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
However, as universal jurisdiction is partly lacking in basis in positive international law, 
these two regimes need further development to fulfil the objective of ending impunity.  
 
Prosecuting based on universal jurisdiction, and at the supra-national level, should not be a 
process of relative gains, but rather absolute gains. This thesis has argued that universal 
jurisdiction can fill some of the impunity gaps in the ICC regime, thereby acting as a 
complement. At some points, complementarity and universal jurisdiction can even act as 
catalysts, especially through positive complementarity and the investigations in early 
universal jurisdiction proceedings. 
 
As this thesis argues in the case of amnesty, universal jurisdiction and the ICC together can 
fill an impunity gap where criminal proceedings are hindered because of domestic political 
deals. Although, the possible conflict with states sovereignty can here be an issue.  
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Although this thesis argues that there are shortcomings in the concept of universal 
jurisdiction, it may help indirectly by contributing to international criminal law by raising 
awareness of international crimes and interpreting and creating case law and treaties 
outside the ICC. But most importantly, it may serve a direct relevance by filling the 
impunity gap in the complementarity regime, provided that it is exercised with some 
restraint and political independence. As the Court is reserved for the most serious cases, it 
will be up to national proceedings to handle the bulk of cases. The exercise of universal 
jurisdiction may, as this thesis argues, serve to investigate and prosecute in those situations 
where the State with the territorial nexus is unwilling or unable or in the cases where the 
perpetrator has sought refuge in another State. However, the shortcomings of universal 
jurisdiction limit the role it can have, as argued in Section 5.2. 
 
Success for the ICC will not lie in the expansion of the number of cases by expanding 
institutional capacity, but instead may be found in enabling national prosecution, including 
the use of universal jurisdiction, to be the spear point for ending impunity for international 
crimes. This has been the goal from the start of the ICC for its first Prosecutor, that the 
success of the Court should be measured in the overall effect on impunity.267 
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